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Eldad Ben Aharon is a lecturer at Leiden University, the Netherlands. He is a historian of
international relations who specializes in the field of modern Middle East studies and the
region’s diplomatic history during the Cold War. Ben Aharon obtained his PhD in 2019
from Royal Holloway University of London and is currently writing a book on Israeli–
Turkish–American relations at key moments in the last decade of the Cold War as seen
through the prism of the Armenian genocide.
Turkey’s Preparations for the Centenary of the Armenian Genocide
On April 23, 2014, as Turkey anticipated increasing international pressure to
recognize the Armenian genocide as such on its centenary in 2015, Turkey’s
then-prime minister and current president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, sent a
special condolence message to Armenian communities around the world. Pub-
lished in nine languages, the message acknowledged the deaths of the Ottoman
Armenians who perished alongside millions of people of all religions and ethnicities
in the events of 1915, describing the tragedy as “our shared pain.” Erdoğan stated
that “millions of people of all religions and ethnicities lost their lives in World War
I”.1 It seemed that the Turkish leader was finally acknowledging some basic facts
about the genocide; however, in practice, the message was a sophisticated form of
denial that placed the Armenian genocide within the context of a world war, along-
side the loss of life of ethnic Turks.
This article will explore the connection between Erdoğan’s message and the recent
positions taken by the legislatures of three NATO members—the United States,
Germany, and the Netherlands—all of which are traditional allies of Ankara.
From 2016 to 2019, the parliaments of all three countries formally recognized
the Armenian genocide. This development marked the transition from a stance
based on pragmatism to one focused on “soft power,” and came after many
years of hesitation.2 Israel, on the other hand—which holds the same interests
as the other allies with regard to Ankara, though it is not a NATO member—
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has continued to adhere to its position that the mass slaughter of Armenians was
not a genocide. Unlike the aforementioned countries, Israel did not seize the
opportunity presented by Erdoğan’s declaration to recognize the genocide, even
though a number of Knesset members lobbied for such a move.
The decision of the US, Germany, and the Netherlands to alter their traditional
positions on the Armenian genocide was no accident. I will argue that their new
stance reflects three main factors: first, Erdoğan’s own 2014 statement and the pro-
gressive weakening of NATO—specifically, the crumbling relations between
Turkey and its three allies; second, the process of introspection and eventual
acknowledgement of their own role in the perpetuation of Turkey’s denial; and
third, that acknowledgment of the Armenian genocide by three NATO allies
reflected the growing scrutiny of Erdoğan’s policies, especially toward the Kurds.
This article will also examine the deteriorating relations between Israel and
Turkey, and in that context, the position of the Knesset on the Armenian genocide,
namely, its continued refusal to recognize it as such, largely to preserve the
“unique” nature of the Holocaust.
Parliamentary as Opposed to Governmental Recognition:
Conceptual Clarity
First, the expression “recognition of the Armenian genocide”must be clarified, and
a distinction must also be made between the roles played by the executive and the
legislative branches regarding this issue. As a rule, the Armenians continue to insist
that legislatures around the world recognize the genocide. While this is mostly
symbolic, it is also of critical importance. Most important is that symbolic recog-
nition makes it feasible to legislate a memorial day or official memorial events.
This is a significant step that contributes not only to commemoration and to the
preservation of the historical heritage of ethnic groups, but in certain cases also
enables the establishment of a national commemorative museum partially or
fully funded by the state.3 Thus, the struggle for recognition is significant for
three parties: the Armenians, the Turks, and the country debating whether to
recognize the Armenian genocide.
It is important to appreciate that legislatures and executives may have different
and even conflicting interests in this matter. From the mid-1970s, the govern-
ments of the US, Israel, Germany, the Netherlands, and a number of other
countries did not recognize the Armenian genocide due to concerns over their
bilateral ties with Turkey. The basic premise was that recognition of the Arme-
nian genocide would lead to a significant and almost automatic deterioration of
relations with Ankara, the recall of ambassadors, and a possible rupture that
could cause grave harm to vital interests. Consequently, governments with
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good or even average diplomatic relations with Turkey would have no interest in
recognizing the genocide. In fact, it was in their clear interest not to do so.
Legislatures, on the other hand, give voice to a broader range of norms, values, and
ethics, and offer a platform for the discussion of minority rights. For this reason,
recognition could cause tension between a country’s legislature and its executive.
The Contested Memories of the Armenian Genocide
in International Relations: A Concise History
In order to understand the political and international developments surrounding
recognition of the Armenian genocide, it must first be explained how the genocide
became a diplomatic instrument in international relations. Until the mid-1960s, a
“conspiracy of silence” cloaked the issue, which served Turkey’s interests. This
was possible mainly because in the years following 1915, the genocide led to the
worldwide dispersion of the surviving Armenians. New Armenian communities
were established that had to contend with staggering loss and trauma.4 The
uprooting and dispersal of the Armenians undermined their ability to consolidate
a collective memory of the genocide. Therefore, the Armenian diaspora was unable
to process what had happened in a focused and united manner. Above all, it was
the Cold War that was the root of that failure; it polarized the Armenian commu-
nities living on either side under regimes that took vastly different approaches to
human rights, freedom of speech, collective memory, and commemoration. The
Armenian communities were influenced by the surroundings in which they lived
during the world wars and the Cold War, and this prevented them from conduct-
ing a meaningful dialogue about the suppression of their trauma.5
At the same time, for their part, the Turks exploited the conspiracy of silence sur-
rounding the fate of the Armenians in Turkey to foster an institutionalized denial of
the 1915 genocide. Successive generations born and raised in Turkey after World
War I raised on nationalist Kemalism, and the young citizens of the secular repub-
lic of Turkey were taught to deny the Armenian genocide as part of the secular
nationalist narrative and the reengineering of Turkish society. This included rede-
signing Turkish cities with an emphasis on modern European features, and in the
process, all traces of the Armenian genocide were systematically obscured or
erased. The cultural and urban elements of those cities that had been created by
the Armenians who had lived there were eradicated.6 The subject of the Armenian
genocide became taboo and its very mention could (and still does) lead to indict-
ments on charges of insulting the Turkish nation.7
The conspiracy of silence began to crumble when the issue burst onto the inter-
national scene in 1973. It was at this time that two Armenian terrorist organiz-
ations began mounting operations against Turkish targets around the world.
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The first, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA),
which operated out of Lebanon and Soviet Armenia, was in competition with
the second, the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG), operat-
ing mainly out of North America and Western Europe. Beyond targeting Turkish
diplomats and seeking to compel Turkey to recognize the genocide, they also urged
Armenians living on both sides of the Iron Curtain to work together to remind the
world about their common tragedy. In the 1980s, the organizations’ terror oper-
ations and assassinations caused the deaths of more than sixty Turkish diplomats
and their family members.8
The terrorism directed against Turkish embassies in Western countries in the early
1980s actually drew mixed responses to the Armenian cause: For the most part,
western Europeans expressed sympathy or indifference, while the US roundly
denounced the attacks.9 Some countries, including Israel, condemned the terror-
ism and leveraged the opportunity to improve ties with the Turkish foreign minis-
try. They worked together to disrupt ASALA cooperation with Palestinian
terrorists, who were themselves training in southern Lebanon.10 Despite the inter-
national condemnation, the Armenians also achieved some success during those
years. The topic of the Armenian genocide was increasingly present in inter-
national forums and during the late 1980s became a subject for discussion in leg-
islatures worldwide. On the other hand, in the early 1980s, the Armenian
campaign forced Ankara to launch for the first time an international denial cam-
paign aimed at exerting pressure on Western countries, including Israel, to
support the Turkish narrative.11
From Pragmatism to Soft Power: A Comparative Analysis of
Germany, the Netherlands, and the US
In the years prior to 2016, Berlin (and before it, Bonn) refrained from recognizing
the Armenian genocide for three reasons. The first and least well known is related
to Germany’s recognition of the “unique nature of the Holocaust.” In other words,
West Germany—and from 1990, unified Germany—sought to preserve its stand-
ing as the only modern country to take full responsibility for its crimes, recognize
the injustices it committed, and make restitution payments to the victims of the
genocide it perpetrated, enabling it to serve as what might be called a “beacon
of morality.”12 Berlin’s interest in maintaining the Holocaust’s “uniqueness” over-
rode Germany’s interest in formally recognizing the Armenian genocide until the
early 2000s. Germany feared that this recognition—together with that of other
countries—might cause Turkey to admit to having perpetrated a genocide and
thus strip Germany of its status as moral standard bearer.
The second reason is related to Germany’s own partial culpability for the Arme-
nian genocide. The German and Ottoman Empires had been close allies during
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World War I, and the Germans provided considerable assistance to the Ottomans,
for example, by helping them confiscate bank accounts, insurance policies, and
deposits in the Reichsbank belonging to Ottoman Armenians.13 The continued
suppression of the memory of the 1915 genocide enabled Germany to refrain
from addressing its own guilt as a facilitator. The third explanation is related to
the fact that since the 1960s, a sizeable Turkish minority numbering close to
three million immigrants has lived in Germany, and it was feared that should
the Armenian genocide be formally recognized, they would find themselves in a
state of conflict between their loyalties to Germany and Turkey.14
However, studies conducted by two German scholars, Hilmar Kaiser in the late
1990s and Stefan Ihrig in the 2010s, revealed the extent of ties between Turkey
and the Third Reich, and that the “success” of the Armenian genocide was actually
a source of inspiration for Hitler.15 Moreover, a documentary film released in 2010
exposed the extent of German culpability. This precipitated a change in the public
discourse in Germany regarding responsibility for the Armenian genocide.16
The timing of Erdoğan’s April 2014 statement acknowledging some of the basic
facts of the Armenian genocide—albeit absent any change in Turkey’s genocide-
denial policy—further nudged the Germans toward recognition and opened the
door to action by the Bundestag without wreaking complete havoc on German–
Turkish relations. The stage was set to recognize the genocide, continuing the
use of soft power to advance the Armenian cause. On June 2, 2016, the Bundestag
recognized the destruction of the Armenians as an act of genocide.17 Chancellor
Angela Merkel backed the deputies’ decision and stood her ground in the face
of the furious rhetoric emanating from Ankara. She declared that Germany’s
deep and longstanding relationship with Turkey would not be harmed by their
individual differences of opinion over the Armenian genocide, noting immediately
after the vote, “There is a lot that binds Germany to Turkey and… our friendship,
our strategic ties, are great.”18 Significantly, the Bundestag passed the resolution
despite the fact that Germany needed Erdoğan’s cooperation in 2016 in granting
sanctuary to Syrian refugees as part of an agreement with the European Union.19
For many years, the Netherlands also refrained from declaring the events of 1915 a
genocide. The attitude among DutchMPs toward the Armenian genocide relied on
the assumption that it should be called the “Armenian question,” the official term
employed by Turkey.20 The Netherlands, like Germany, refrained from potentially
forcing their own citizens of Turkish descent (a large minority of some 400,000)
into an identity crisis, consequently eschewing even discussing the subject in
The Hague.21 Like Germany, the Netherlands felt it bore a degree of indirect
responsibility for the genocide and had not done enough to prevent it. That is
one reason the subject was avoided in the public discourse. As a “neutral” state
in World War I, the question of responsibility for the genocide remained unan-
swered, although Dutch politicians such as William van Ravesteijn and
Eldad Ben Aharon
5
Abraham Kuyper had lambasted Dutch journalists who refrained from reporting
on the Armenian genocide, thus preventing the Dutch public from learning
about what had happened.22 The Netherlands was also targeted by Armenian
terror when the son of the Turkish ambassador in The Hague, Ahmet Benler,
was assassinated in October 1979. Surprisingly, that did not stir up any particular
interest in the Armenian genocide in the Dutch media and over the years, the
subject was rarely discussed.23
More importantly, the reason for shunting aside the memory of the Armenian gen-
ocide is related to the centrality of Holocaust commemoration in Dutch public
debate, the story of the destruction of the country’s Jewish community, and the
German occupation from 1940–45. Having been conquered by the Nazis the
Dutch people also considered themselves victims. However, in the past twenty
years, there has been considerable academic and public discourse on the question
of Dutch culpability for the destruction of Dutch Jewry. Despite its small size, the
Netherlands boasts the largest per capita number—5,778—of people recognized
by Yad Vashem as Righteous Among the Nations, non-Jews who rescued Jews
during the Holocaust. However, the fact that so many Dutch Jews—almost
104,000, or 75 percent of the entire Jewish population—were transported to
German death camps in occupied Poland can be explained largely by the partial
collaboration of some local Dutch citizens.24 Difficult questions have been
raised, for example, regarding the responsibility of the Dutch railway company,
which collaborated in the deportation of Jews from Amsterdam to the Westerbork
transit camp on the Dutch–German border and from there to Auschwitz and
Sobibor.25 The centrality of Jewish victimhood and the crimes of the Nazis
eclipsed the discourse on the Armenians.
It was only in 2004 that the Armenian genocide received formal Dutch recognition
for the first time when The Hague acknowledged that crimes against humanity had
been committed in the Ottoman Empire, although it continued to refrain from
explicitly employing the word “genocide.”26 In 2017, a diplomatic incident
marred relations between the Netherlands and Turkey when the Turkish
foreign minister was denied permission to hold a pro-Turkish rally in Rotterdam.
The Turkish foreign minister was expelled from the Netherlands and Erdoğan
responded sharply, condemning the Dutch as “Nazi remnants.”27 Although the
crisis was defused a few months later and relations between the two countries
were restored, Erdoğan’s harsh rhetoric, which sparked the severe diplomatic inci-
dent between The Hague and Ankara, left the Dutch with a bitter taste. Erdoğan’s
declaration in 2014 and the German Bundestag’s recognition of the genocide in
2016 together provided a tailwind for the Dutch recognition. Indeed, in 2018,
the Dutch parliament decided to formally acknowledge the mass killing of Arme-
nians by Ottoman Turks in 1915 as a genocide.28 Then, too, Turkey inveighed
against the decision and recalled its ambassador for consultations, but this failed
to convince the Netherlands to reverse its decision.
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In the US, a change in the position of Congress took place in late 2019, when the
House of Representatives resolved to finally recognize the Armenian genocide.29
Over the years, Washington has trodden cautiously and never offered formal rec-
ognition. Turkey’s membership in the NATO alliance and its central role during
and after the ColdWar frequently scuttled attempts by Congress over the previous
forty years to fully recognize the genocide and subsequently legislate the creation
of an official day of remembrance for its victims. For reasons of national security—
for example to obstruct Soviet access to Western Europe and maintain Washing-
ton’s accessibility to the Persian Gulf through Turkey—the various American
administrations refrained from confronting Ankara, potentially sparking a crisis
over the memory of the Armenian genocide.30 Like Berlin, over the past forty
years, Washington also played a major role in supporting the Turkish denial
narrative.
The change in the Congressional stance came in the immediate wake of the violent
clash between the Turkish army and the Kurdish minority during Operation Peace
Spring in northeast Syria in September and October 2019.31 The anti-Turkish tone
in Washington was observed across the political spectrum, especially regarding
Erdoğan and his hawkish approach toward the Kurdish minority, which had
assisted the Americans in their war on ISIS.32 The feeling in Washington was
that Erdoğan’s Turkey had gone too far; the alliance between Trump and
Erdoğan was not helpful to either of them.33 On October 29, 2019, the House
of Representatives passed a precedent-setting bill (by a near-unanimous vote of
405 for and 11 against) on the matter of the Armenian genocide.34 Congress
passed a sanctions package against Turkey later that year.35 An eventual decision
to recognize the Armenian genocide in the Senate would also mean that the US
was committed to allocating federal resources toward building a US memorial to
the victims of the 1915 genocide and to the establishment of an official, annual
memorial day for the Armenian genocide.
From Pragmatism to Soft Power?
Israel’s Policy on the Armenian Genocide, 1982–2016
As noted, conflicting views on the Armenian genocide appeared on the inter-
national scene only in the late 1970s, and Israel’s position on the issue was also con-
solidated during that time, developing over three distinct periods: The first was
1982–89, when, after many years of silence, Turkey first began to contend with
the “Armenian question” on the international scene. To that end, Ankara created
a well-oiled denial machine, for which it also received aid from Israel’s foreign min-
istry and Jewish organizations in the US and Turkey.36 The second period was
1989–2000, when Israel continued to provide international support for the
Turkish narrative, but this was also when the subject was first put forward for dis-
cussion in the Knesset plenary. Throughout this period, despite pressure from
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individual Israeli MPs, the Knesset largely acquiesced to the foreign ministry’s
request to keep this discourse from the public eye.37
The third period began in 2001, shortly before Erdoğan first came to power (2002)
and continues until the present day. Similar to the serious diplomatic crisis between
The Hague and Ankara in 2017, and between Washington and Ankara in 2019,
Israeli–Turkish relations have also been buffeted by several crises since 2008.
Examples include Operation Cast Lead in Gaza in 2008, the Mavi Marmara inci-
dent in 2010,38 and the relocation of the US embassy to Jerusalem in 2018, all
of which sparked harsh exchanges between Ankara and Jerusalem and engen-
dered strident rhetoric on the part of both Erdoğan and Netanyahu.39 Similar to
the Dutch and American cases, Israel’s diplomatic clash with Turkey also led to
increased parliamentary pressure and discussion on the subject, especially from
the opposition factions pushing for Israel to give formal recognition. However,
the Knesset did not pass such a resolution, unlike the NATO members that
managed to pass the Armenian resolution during the same period and under
very similar circumstances.
Nevertheless, there are a number of major differences between Israel and the
other countries noted above. Several would have seemed to indicate that recog-
nition by Israel might have been easier to achieve than in the others. The first is
that there is no Turkish lobby in Israel, nor is there a significant ethnic Turkish
minority as in Germany and the Netherlands, for whom recognition of the gen-
ocide might precipitate an identity crisis. Second, in the case of Israel, the issues
of responsibility and guilt (for supporting the Ottomans or failing to help prevent
the Armenian genocide) are irrelevant, since the State of Israel did not yet exist in
1915 and the pre-state Yishuv was itself subjected to the repressive policies of the
Turks.
However, one of the most striking differences between Israel and the NATO
members discussed here is that since the early 2000s, Azerbaijan has become a
major factor in Israel’s position on recognition of the Armenian genocide. This
period saw a warming of relations between Jerusalem and Baku, a secular
Muslim country on the Caspian Sea. The ramified economic ties between Israel
and the Azeris, which in recent years have included arms sales, have brought the
two countries closer together.40 The border shared by Iran and Azerbaijan and
the concerns of Jerusalem and Baku over the Iranian nuclear project have also
served to bolster mutual ties. For some years, Israel also sought to create a triangular
alliance with Turkey and Azerbaijan, which enjoy good mutual relations and
together influence events in the Caucasus.
Some consider this Israeli policy a continuation of David Ben-Gurion’s Periphery
Doctrine, which embraced the non-Arab states in the region.41 Importantly, the
territorial conflict between the Azeris and the Armenians over control of
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Nagorno-Karabakh, triggered by the collapse of the Soviet Union, turned Azerbai-
jan into a stakeholder in the discourse on the Armenian genocide, and it led an
extensive international campaign against recognition. Thus the Azeris, like the
Turks, have a significant interest in Israel not recognizing the Armenian genocide.
The Azerbaijan–Israel International Association (AzIz), the aim of which is to
advance relations between the two countries, speaks out against the recognition
of the Armenian genocide at discussions of the Knesset Education Committee.42
The organization argues in favor of the importance of strengthening relations
between the countries, and advocates for the security of the Jewish community
in Azerbaijan and for recognizing Turkey and the Ottoman Empire for saving
Jewish refugees who fled from the Spanish Inquisition in 1492 to lands under
the Empire’s control. These arguments resemble those made by the Turks,
which indeed held sway in Knesset discussions, especially in light of the relatively
modest endeavors in the Knesset plenary in favor of the Armenians.
The “Uniqueness” of the Holocaust and
Recognition of the Armenian Genocide
Beyond the changing geopolitical circumstances, there remains a basic, fixed issue,
less influenced by outside parties but one that affects Israeli policy in regard to rec-
ognition of the Armenian genocide—the memory of the Holocaust as “unique.” For
Germany, which assumes moral and material responsibility for the murder of six
million Jews (and which is manifested in the payment of restitution in accordance
with the 1952 Luxembourg Agreement), the memory of the Holocaust has played
an important role in society and national identity. That is also the case—though
obviously for very different reasons—in Israel, where the commitment to “never
again” has been a watchword in society, politics, and diplomacy ever since the
birth of the Jewish State, and especially since 1967. Immediately before the out-
break of the Six-Day War, the genocidal rhetoric in the Arab media and by
Arab leaders was a stark reminder of the potential for a second Holocaust.43 As
historian Alon Confino maintains, “In Israel, as in the world, a change occurred
in Holocaust memory from the 1970s up to the present. It is one that is central
and now emphasizes victims rather than heroism.”44
Were Israel to recognize the Armenian genocide, the possible legislation of an offi-
cial memorial day in honor of the 1915 genocide would fall in close proximity to
Yom Ha-Shoah [Holocaust Martyrs’ and Heroes Remembrance Day], since the
International Armenian Genocide Remembrance Day falls on April 24. This
could serve as a major obstacle, because it might actualize the threat of “compe-
tition” over genocide commemoration and of the possible “trivialization” of
Jewish suffering, according to those who espouse that view. This situation, as
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noted, is unrelated to geopolitical variables or to Israel’s foreign relations but is
rather an internal matter having to do with Jewish and Israeli identity.
Prior to Erdoğan’s 2014 declaration, Turkey’s NATO allies and Israel were fully
aligned: recognizing the Armenian genocide could have been harmful to relations
with Turkey and consequently to NATO’s geopolitical interests and collective
security. Thus, before 2019 it was impossible to assess the actual weight of the
“uniqueness” claim with respect to Israel’s position since geopolitical interests
were the supposed basis of Israel’s policy. However, after Turkey’s loss of influ-
ence over its NATO allies, the enactment of laws in the German, Dutch, and
US legislatures further complicated those nations’ respective relationships with
Turkey, putting Israel in the spotlight. Given that the Israeli legislature did not
change its stance, it is evident that the “uniqueness” claim holds significant
weight in Israeli discourse and will bear monitoring in the coming years.
Conclusion
For forty years, the main consideration guiding Germany, the Netherlands, and the
US on this issue was the fear that formal recognition of the Armenian genocide
could precipitate a crisis with Turkey, a key NATO ally, thus undermining the col-
lective security of the alliance. That these countries changed their positions
between 2016–19 was the result of a number of developments at that point in time:
Erdoğan’s 2014 declaration; the weakening of the NATO alliance and general criti-
cism of Erdoğan’s policies (particularly toward the Kurds); and the change in the
public and academic discourse in Germany and the Netherlands. Since 2016,
Turkey’s loss of influence over its NATO allies has been significant. That develop-
ment and Ankara’s harsh policies contributed to the actions taken in those three
countries. Turkey overplayed its hand and this worked in the Armenians’ favor.
The “uniqueness” of the Holocaust for Germany and the question of German and
Dutch responsibility for their failure to intervene to prevent the Armenian geno-
cide during World War I helped marginalize it until 2016. However, from
2016–19, a series of recurring diplomatic crises occurred between Turkey and
the Netherlands (resulting in a cooling in their relations), as well as between
Turkey and the US, around a number of major issues. These diplomatic rows trig-
gered increased ethical introspection on the part of these countries, including
regarding the long-term support they had provided to Turkey in continuing its
denialist rhetoric. The coalescence of these factors eased the transition from an
approach based solely on pragmatic considerations to one that included the
moral perspective as well.
Israel, too, has always been a focus of attention in the discussion of the Armenian
genocide. The change in the positions of the three NATO allies might put the
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spotlight on Israel in the near future. Although the Armenian genocide has been
discussed in the Knesset since 1989, Israel’s lawmakers have not strayed from
the position of their foreign ministry and have consistently eschewed formal recog-
nition. The prevailing view in Jerusalem was and remains that Israeli recognition
by both the Knesset and the government does not serve Israel’s geopolitical inter-
ests in the Middle East, especially its strategic and economic cooperation with
Turkey. Although relations between Jerusalem and Ankara have been in decline
since 2017, and despite considerable criticism of Erdoğan from across Israel’s pol-
itical spectrum, the Knesset has refrained from passing a resolution that would
acknowledge the Armenian genocide. Hence, despite similarities shared by
Israel, the Netherlands, and the US, the Knesset appears to be weighing the dip-
lomatic cost of formally recognizing the genocide against the benefit of its strategic
alliance with Azerbaijan, which is engaged in a longstanding conflict with the
Armenians.
The Knesset’s main concern is to refrain from compromising a deeply rooted
element of Israeli-Jewish identity associated with the most tragic event in
Jewish history: the memory of the Holocaust as “unique.” Israel may fear that a
symbolic recognition of the Armenian genocide could pave the way for the
future legislation of a national memorial day that could “compete” with Yom Ha-
Shoah, also marked in Israel each year in late April. Therefore, it may be concluded
with considerable certainty that Israel’s continued adherence to its traditional pos-
ition is mainly due to its desire to preserve the “uniqueness” of the Holocaust and
its place in the hierarchy of victimhood.
Translated from the Hebrew by Ruchie Avital
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